Before 2000, the UK operated one of the most liberal political finance regimes of any established democracy. Parties were highly dependent on private financing, state funding was minimal, limited transparency requirements existed with respect to party income or expenditure, and no limits applied to national election spending. Far-reaching reforms introduced by Labour in 2000 changed this regulatory environment radically, establishing donation disclosure requirements and capping election spending. However, Labour's reforms did not include significant increases in state funding, leaving the UK as a continued outlier in Western Europe in assuming political parties should predominantly be funded through private means. In this paper, we show how the Conservatives ultimately prospered under Labour's reforms, enabling them to greatly outspend Labour at four general elections from 2010 to 2019. Using the public registers created by Labour's reforms, we document how the party's financial re-stabilisation while in opposition was assisted to a surprising degree by state funding and how the party's donor base has shifted towards wealthy individuals and privately owned companies since its return to government in 2010. We conclude with a number of observations about how the apparently exceptional UK case can help generate important insights for the comparative study of political finance.

This article aims to explain the deviant German case of an early and comprehensive regulation of party donations (combining a high level of transparency and incentives for small donations). Given the limited explanatory power of economic and institutional factors, the article emphasises the causal role of ideas for a policy stabilisation which occurred after 1993. A process-tracing analysis suggests that the 1983–1993 reform period was characterised by a conflict of ideas. During this conflict, ideas regarding undisclosed donations as an anti-democratic interference with democratic political competition came to prevail over ideas regarding all donations as a necessary condition for democratic competition irrespective of their regulation. The key actors in this conflict were, on the one hand, the new Green party which resuscitated the idea of donations being potentially anti-democratic and, on the other hand, the Constitutional Court which ultimately endorsed this ideational legacy promoted by the Greens. After 1993, donations in Germany came to be accepted as a necessary evil whose anti-democratic potential had to be limited by transparency obligations and incentives for small donations. The findings presented here suggest that policymakers need to link attempts to regulate party donations to ideational legacies (if available) to successfully tackle political corruption.

Fundraising is an essential part of the political enterprise. In almost all countries, parties and candidates rely on donations in order to collect sufficient resources to finance their political activities. While most of the existing research in the past has focused on the motivation of donors to contribute to parties and candidates, this article starts from the premise that the level of donations can best be explained by an interplay of supply-side factors (donors) and demand-side factors (political actors). This article specifically focuses on the demand-side: which policy and strategies do political actors develop to seek donations from various sources? To this end, explanatory factors on three main dimensions – institutional, inter-party, intra-party – were examined with regards to the fundraising strategies of European political parties and foundations. Based on a combination of a document analysis and semi-structured interviews, the article will show how the regulatory framework, the possibility of a public backlash, party ideology and the general income structure of political parties influence their donation policy.

This article presents a longitudinal comparative analysis of the regulation of private funding to political parties in 15 West European democracies and explores how these rules have changed under the most recent wave of political finance reforms. In particular, the article questions whether a deregulation of political finance regulation may be in sight, with a downsizing of the role of the state in the political finance domain. While evidence does not support a clear movement toward deregulation, the article shows that the move from private to public subsidization may not be that irreversible as it seemed and that private funding to political parties is likely to become more prominent in the near future also in Europe.

The datasets on the Italian political class provides two sets of information: (a) census data on a broad spectrum of individual-level variables on elected politicians, offering an updated mapping of the characteristics of more than 20,000 Italian representatives at all governmental levels; (b) survey data on politicians' attitudes towards elections, participation, public opinion, several national and international policy issues, and their views of political representation. Between September 2020 and January 2021, 2134 elected politicians at the local (n = 1917), regional (n = 128), national (n = 75) and European (n = 14) levels were interviewed, making this one of the largest surveys of the Italian political elites ever conducted and a valuable resource for researchers interested in the study of democratic representation.

A common challenge in studying Italian parliamentary discourse is the lack of accessible, machine-readable, and systematized parliamentary data. To address this, this article introduces the ItaParlCorpus dataset, a new, annotated, machine-readable collection of Italian parliamentary plenary speeches for the Camera dei Deputati, the lower house of Parliament, spanning from 1948 to 2022. This dataset encompasses 470 million words and 2.4 million speeches delivered by 5830 unique speakers representing 77 different political parties. The files are designed for easy processing and analysis using widely-used programming languages, and they include metadata such as speaker identification and party affiliation. This opens up opportunities for in-depth analyses on a variety of topics related to parliamentary behavior, elite rhetoric, and the salience of political themes, exploring how these vary across party families and over time.